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The Born rule may be stated mathematically as the rule that probabilities in quantum theory
are expectation values of a complete orthogonal set of projection operators. This rule works for
single laboratory settings in which the observer can distinguish all the different possible outcomes
corresponding to the projection operators. However, theories of inflation suggest that the universe
may be so large that any laboratory, no matter how precisely it is defined by its internal state, may
exist in a large number of very distantly separated copies throughout the vast universe. In this case,
no observer within the universe can distinguish all possible outcomes for all copies of the laboratory.
Then normalized probabilities for the local outcomes that can be locally distinguished cannot be
given by the expectation values of any projection operators. Thus the Born rule dies and must be
replaced by another rule for observational probabilities in cosmology. The freedom of what this new
rule is to be is the measure problem in cosmology. A particular volume-averaged form is proposed.
PACS numbers: PACS 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ca, 02.50.Cw, 98.80.Qc,
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum theory, all probabilities for a system are
supposed to be encoded in its quantum state. This may
be true, but there is the question of how to decode the
quantum state to give these probabilities. In traditional
quantum theory, using the statistical interpretation of
the wavefunction given by the Nobel Prize-winning Born
rule [1], the probabilities are given by the expectation
values of projection operators. Once a possible obser-
vation is specified (including the corresponding projec-
tion operator), then its probability is given purely by the
quantum state as the expectation value the state assigns
to the projection operator.
This prescription seems to work well in ordinary single
laboratory settings, where the observer can distinguish
between a set of different outcomes. Then distinct ob-
servations are mutually exclusive, so that different ones
cannot both be observed. If one assigns a projection op-
erator to each possible distinct observation in a complete
exhaustive set, then these projection operators will be
orthonormal, and their expectation values will be non-
negative and sum to unity, which are conditions neces-
sary for them to be interpreted as the probabilities of the
different possible observations.
However, in cosmology there is the possibility that the
universe is so large that there are many copies of each
laboratory and observer, no matter how precisely the
laboratory and observer are defined. (Here what one in-
terprets to be a ‘laboratory’ can be as small or as large
as one would like, perhaps as small as a single particle
or as large as the entire earth or solar system, or maybe
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even as large as an entire causal diamond [2]. Similarly,
the observer can be as small or as large as one might
consider an observer to be, perhaps as small as whatever
part of the brain of a tiny animal leads to a single con-
scious perception, or as large as a whole community, such
as a human scientific information gathering and utilizing
system [3], or even as large as the set of all humans and
other conscious beings within the solar system. For this
discussion, however, I would like to restrict to cases in
which the different parts of the ‘observer’ are in commu-
nication with each other, so that I shall not count as a
single ‘observer’ collections of more than one entirely sep-
arate civilization, not in communication with each other,
say very widely separated within the universe so that
they actually or effectively have no causal contact with
each other.)
This possibility of many identical copies of each lab-
oratory and observer raises the problem [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
that two observations that are seen as distinct for an ob-
server are not mutually exclusive in a global viewpoint
of the entire universe; both can occur for different copies
of the laboratory and observer (though neither copy may
be aware of that). This would not be a problem for a pu-
tative superobserver who can observe all possible sets of
observations by all observers over the entire universe, but
it is a problem for the assignment of normalized prob-
abilities for the possible observations that are distinct
for each copy of the observer. The result [5, 7] is that
one cannot get such a set of normalized probabilities as
the expectation values of projection operators in the full
quantum state of the universe.
One can use Tegmark’s language [8, 9, 10] of a ‘bird’
for a superobserver that can ‘observe’ (not necessarily in
the traditional quantum sense of making a measurement
that disturbs the system) or know the entire history of
the universe (or its entire quantum state), and a ‘frog’
2for a localized observer that is entirely in communication
or causal contact with itself within the universe. The
problem is that traditional quantum theory with its Born
rule applies to birds but not to frogs, if the universe is
so large that there are many exact copies of the frogs.
In other words, traditional quantum mechanics is for the
birds.
What we need instead is a replacement of Born’s rule
that applies within the universe to us frogs that might
exist in many copies, identical except for our location
relative to our distant surroundings that we are not aware
of. (If different frogs are aware that their surroundings
are different, that awareness makes the frogs themselves
different and so not exact copies of each other. But if
the differences in the surroundings are not reflected in
the internal states of the frogs, say if the surroundings
are so far away that they are not in causal contact with
the frogs, then the frogs can be identical and yet be at
different locations as seen by the birds.)
One can still postulate that there are rules for getting
the probabilities of all possible frog observations from the
quantum state, but then the question arises as to what
these rules are. Below we shall give examples of several
different possibilities for these rules, showing that they
are not uniquely determined. Thus, they are logically
independent of the question of what the quantum state is.
Therefore, the quantum state just by itself is insufficient
to determine the probabilities of observations for us frogs
within the universe.
The main application of the logical independence of the
probability rules is to the measure problem in cosmology
[6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60], the problem of how to make statistical
predictions for observations in a universe that may be so
large that almost all theoretically possible observations
actually occur somewhere. The logical independence im-
plies that the solution to the measure problem is not just
the quantum state of the universe but also other indepen-
dent elements, the rules for getting the probabilities of
the localized (frog) observations from the quantum state.
II. THE SET OF ALL POSSIBLE
OBSERVATIONS
One goal of science is to produce good theories Ti that
enable one to predict the probabilities of results of obser-
vations by localized observers within the universe (‘frogs’,
rather than ‘birds’ that are hypothetical superobservers
for the entire universe). For brevity, I shall refer to the
results of observations simply as ‘observations.’ Here for
simplicity I shall assume that there is a countable set of
possible distinct observations Oj out of some exhaustive
set of all such observations.
If one imagines a continuum for the set of observa-
tions (which seems to be logically possible, though not
required), in that case I shall assume that they are binned
into a countable number of exclusive and exhaustive sub-
sets that each may be considered to form one distinct ob-
servation Oj . Then the goal of a good complete theory
Ti is to calculate the probability Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) for
each possible observation Oj , given the theory Ti.
The set of possible observations might be, for exam-
ple, all possible conscious perceptions [28, 61], all possi-
ble data sets for one person, all possible contents for an
eprint arXiv, all possible data sets for a human scientific
information gathering and utilizing system [3], or all pos-
sible data sets for any community of observers. However,
as mentioned above, I shall assume that the observer,
whether a single organism or a whole community, is in
complete causal contact with itself and is not a collection
of disconnected organisms or communities.
In order that the sum of the probabilities for all mem-
bers of the set of possible observations be unity, I shall
also assume that the set of observations is mutually ex-
clusive, so that any particular observation is a unique
and distinct member of the set. In particular, each ob-
servation is to be complete and not a subset of another
observation, to avoid double counting and unnormalized
probabilities. The simplest way I know to impose this is
to take observations to be conscious perceptions, all that
an organism is phenomenally aware of at once [28, 61].
I shall generally have in mind this example of what an
observation is, but my argument applies to any definition
of an observation so long as the possible observations are
mutually exclusive.
For example, if one defined observations to be data
obtained by or held by a community of observers rather
than by a single organism, one needs to define what com-
prises the community so that subsets of the community
are not separately counted. That is, suppose one has
organisms A, B, and C with observed data α, β, and
γ respectively. One could define communal observers to
be any subset of the set {A,B,C} of organisms and ob-
servations to be the data of that subset. One allowed
choice of what the observations are would be {α, β, γ},
with these three distinct observations (analogous to my
personal preference for taking the observations to be con-
scious perceptions, assuming that each conscious percep-
tion can be attributed to one or another of the organisms
but not jointly to any combination of them). Another al-
lowed choice would be to take the entire community of
A, B, and C as one observer, so that the observation
would be the combined data of α, β, and γ, making one
single observation, the one-element set {αβγ}. But in
this paper I do not allow one to consider sets of obser-
vations such that one observation within the set is part
of another observation within the set, so that the two
cannot be considered mutually exclusive. That is, I do
not allow the set of observers to be taken to be all pos-
sible nonzero subsets of the set of the three organisms,
the set {A,B,C,AB,AC,BC,ABC} with observations
{α, β, γ, αβ, αγ, βγ, αβγ}, since, for example, the obser-
vation α is part of the observation αβ, so that these two
3observations are not mutually exclusive.
Thus for this paper, the set of possible (frog) obser-
vations must be distinct, so that one observation is not
simply part of another observation also considered to be
within the set. This requirement seems simple to meet if
the observations are considered to be conscious percep-
tions, since if organism A has conscious perception α and
organism B has conscious perception β, the combination
αβ is not a conscious perception but a combination of
two. (Even for a single organism, its conscious percep-
tions at two different times are distinct conscious percep-
tions, and the combination of the two is not a conscious
perception, an awareness that is perceived at once by any
frog within the universe. When one is aware of both the
past and present, this is not actually a combination of
a past conscious perception and a present conscious per-
ception, but a single present conscious perception that
has elements within it both of awareness of the present
and of awareness of memories of the past.) This paper
allows observations to be more general than conscious
perceptions (for those readers sceptical about the fun-
damental nature of conscious perceptions), but for the
conclusions of this paper, one is not allowed to consider
a set of possible observations such that one element of the
set contains another element rather than being distinct
from it.
To give another illustration of the restriction, consider
the idea that observations are finite strings of binary dig-
its within a toy universe made up of an infinite string of
binary digits. It would be acceptable to take the set of
possible observations to be the set of all binary strings
of a certain fixed length, since all such strings would be
distinct. However, if one tried to take the set of possible
observations to be the set of all binary strings of all fi-
nite lengths, then the observations would not be distinct,
since, for example, the string {0101} would be contained
within the string {01010} and so would not be distinct:
if one observation was of {01010}, then the observation
{0101} would also necessarily occur.
This example does not imply that one could not con-
sider the set of possible observations to include strings of
different length, so long as the length is part of the obser-
vation. For example, one could define the set of observa-
tions to be all finite substrings of the universe’s infinite
string that start and end with the string 00 and have no
00 inside (between the two 00’s at the ends). Then the
set of possible observations would be the strings {0000},
{00000}, {00100}, {000100}, {001000}, {001100}, etc.
(with all other strings being longer than these ones ex-
plicitly listed and with {000000} not being a possible
observation since it has a 00 between the two 00’s at
the ends). The idea is that if in this toy model possible
observations are defined to be certain strings of digits or
integers, then no allowed strings should be proper subsets
of other allowed strings.
Note that in this paper I am not assuming that obser-
vations are eigenstates or eigenvalues of Hermitian oper-
ators, or that they correspond to subspaces of a Hilbert
space. Locally they may have that form, but the fact that
the location of the observation is indeterminate (cannot
be known by the frogs making the observation) means
that observations are not globally eigenstates or eigen-
values or subspaces of a Hilbert space. Therefore, theo-
rems such as Gleason’s [62] that may be taken to imply
the uniqueness of Born’s rule need not apply to the frog
observations being considered in this paper.
III. PROBABILITIES FOR OBSERVATIONS
Once one has defined a mutually exclusive set of all
possible observations Oj , a goal of science is to produce
good theories Ti that each give normalized nonnegative
probabilities Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) for the observations Oj ,
∑
j
Pj(i) = 1, (3.1)
for each theory Ti.
One might think that once one has the quantum state,
there would be a standard answer to the question of the
probabilities for the various possible observations. For
example [5, 7], one might take traditional quantum the-
ory (what I there called standard quantum theory) to
use Born’s rule and hence give the probability Pj(i) of
the observation as the expectation value, in the quantum
state given by the theory Ti, of a projection operator Pj
onto the observational result Oj . That is, one might take
Pj(i) = 〈Pj〉i, (3.2)
where 〈〉i denotes the quantum expectation value of
whatever is inside the angular brackets in the quantum
state i given by the theory Ti. This traditional approach
(Born’s rule) works in the case of a single laboratory set-
ting where the projection operators onto different obser-
vational results are orthogonal, PjPk = δjkPj (no sum
over repeated indices).
However [5, 6, 7], in the case of a sufficiently large uni-
verse, one may have many laboratories that are locally
identical (e.g., without consideration of the surroundings
that are not at all reflected by the quantum state or data
within the laboratory, data that are accessible only to a
hypothetical superobserver or bird). Then, within differ-
ent copies of these locally identical laboratories (different
only from the bird perspective), one can have observation
Oj occurring ‘here’ and observation Ok occurring ‘there’
in a compatible way, so that Pj and Pk are not orthog-
onal. Then the traditional quantum probabilities given
by Born’s rule, Eq. (3.2), will not be normalized to obey
Eq. (3.1). An explicit proof of this will now be given for
a toy model.
4IV. TOY MODEL PROOF THAT BORN’S RULE
DOES NOT WORK
To illustrate the problem with Born’s rule and prove
that we cannot obey Eq. (3.1) with Born-rule probabili-
ties Eq. (3.2), let us consider a toy model for a universe
at one moment of time in which each component of the
quantum state has N regions that can each have either
no observer, denoted by 0, or one observer (which, as
discussed above, can be taken to be an entire communi-
cating community, so long as it is defined so that proper
subsets of the community are not also counted as ad-
ditional observers) with observation Oj , denoted by j.
(Different values of N model different sizes of universes
produced by differing amounts of inflation in the cosmo-
logical measure problem.) Write the quantum state as
a superposition, with complex coefficients aN , of compo-
nent states |ψN 〉 that each have different numbers N of
regions:
|ψ〉 =
∞∑
N=1
aN |ψN 〉, (4.1)
where 〈ψM |ψN 〉 = δMN . Let each of these component
states |ψN 〉 of fixed size (number of regions being N)
be called a size eigenstate, or an N -state if we want to
denote the size or number of regions N .
Furthermore, write each component state with a defi-
nite number N of regions as a superposition of orthonor-
mal states in the tensor product of N regions that can
each be labeled by either having no observation, 0, or by
having the observation j, in the region L, 1 ≤ L ≤ N .
That is, if we let µL be either 0 if the region L has no
observer or else j if the region L has the observation j,
then the state for a definite N can be written as
|ψN 〉 =
∑
µ1,µ2,...,µN
bµ1µ2...µN |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉, (4.2)
where the component state |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 has µ1 (either
no observation, 0, or the observation Oj that is denoted
by j) in the first region, µ2 in the second region, and so
on with all µL for 0 ≤ L ≤ N up through µN in the Nth
region. Let each of these component states be called a
bird’s-eye eigenstate of the observations, or a bird eigen-
state. (Each frog can only know of its particular Oj and
not what the bird eigenstate is or even what its own loca-
tion L is within the bird eigenstate with its N regions.)
The full quantum state |ψ〉 is then a superposition of
size eigenstates |ψN 〉 given by Eq. (4.1), with each size
eigenstate being itself a superposition of bird eigenstates
|µ1µ2 . . . µL〉 given by Eq. (4.2).
It is also convenient to define an NNj eigenstate as
the sum, for fixed N , given by Eq. (4.2) restricted to the
terms that have a fixed number Nj of occurrences of the
observation j within the string of regions. One can fur-
ther define an NNjNk eigenstate as the sum, for fixed
N , given by Eq. (4.2) restricted not only to the terms
that have a fixed number Nj of occurrences of the ob-
servation j but also to terms that have the fixed number
Nk of the observation k, j 6= k. One could then include
just these sums for each N in the sum over N given by
Eq. (4.1) to get the corresponding Nj and NjNk eigen-
states that are eigenstates of the occurrence of precisely
Nj observations j and of the mutual occurrence of pre-
cisely Nj observations j and precisely Nk observations k.
Of course, distinguishing all of these eigenstates is only
possible for hypothetical superobservers or birds who can
see the entire universe; it is not possible for the frogs that
can see only what is in their individual regions.
Now let us assume these very minimal principles:
No Extra Vision Principle (NEVP):
The probabilities of observations that have zero ampli-
tudes to occur anywhere in the quantum state are zero;
one cannot see what is not there in the quantum state.
Probability Symmetry Principle (PSP):
If the quantum state is an eigenstate of equal number
of observations of two different observations, then the
probabilities of these two observations are equal.
The No Extra Vision Principle is the assumption that
frogs can’t see what birds don’t see, that if for some j the
bird quantum probability pNLj is zero for all N and L in
theory Ti, then the frog probability Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) is
also zero. In other words, I assume that if there is zero
quantum probability for the bird to see the observation
occurring anywhere, then the probability is also zero for
the frogs to make that observation.
If one did not make some assumption rather like that,
it is hard to see how the quantum state could determine
the frog probabilities in a reasonable way. I suppose one
might take a mystical attitude and postulate that frogs
can see visions of what has no basis in the physical quan-
tum state, but for this paper I shall assume that any-
thing that can be observed within the universe has a
corresponding amplitude in the quantum state.
(Note that this assumption does not rule out visions
or even revelations from God that do not directly corre-
spond to physical reality external to the observer, since
they can be caused by the part of the quantum state
of the observer himself/herself/itself. In principle that
part of the quantum state could even be directly caused
by God Himself without having to go through the usual
mechanism of coming in from external stimuli, though
of course external stimuli can also be directly caused by
God and can be so even in the case in which they are
correctly described by theories of physics; the two de-
scriptions are not logically contradictory. Nothing in this
paper assumes or denies the possibility of such visions
and/or revelations, but I am assuming that whatever is
observed does have a corresponding nonzero amplitude
in the quantum state to mediate it. This might be taken
to be an analogue in physics of the Biblical claim that
the Word became flesh.)
The Probability Symmetry Principle is the assumption
that if the full quantum state |ψ〉 is an NjNk eigenstate
with Nj = Nk in theory Ti, then Pj(i) = Pk(i) for j 6= k
5(though this equality is also trivially true for j = k).
The idea of this principle is that if the quantum state
has equal definite numbers of two different observations,
there seems to be no good reason to assign one of them
greater probability than the other. The only thing that
distinguishes them (other than what the observations are
intrinsically) is their location, and it is hard to see why
that should favor one over another. Furthermore, if one
imagined some sort of diffeomorphism invariance that al-
lowed one to translate any one location to any other,
there would be no absolute distinction to the locations,
so why should one assign different probabilities to obser-
vations at the different locations? (Of course, one could
say that from the bird’s eye view, though not to the frogs,
the relative locations can differ, so it might be that one
of the observations of j is next to another observation of
j, whereas there is no observation of k next to another
observation of k, but it is hard to see why this nonlo-
cal relative information that only the birds have should
affect the probabilities of the local frog observations.)
To show that Born’s rule, Eq. (3.2), necessarily vio-
lates the normalization condition, Eq. (3.1), when the
No Extra Vision Principle and the Probability Symme-
try Principle are assumed, consider the size eigenstates
with N = 2 that have the form
|ψ〉 = b11|11〉+ b12|12〉+ b21|21〉+ b22|22〉, (4.3)
so that in each component, precisely two observations
are made that are either j = 1 or j = 2, with the state
normalized, |b11|2 + |b12|2 + |b21|2 + |b22|2 = 1 .
Now if b11 = 1, so |ψ〉 = |11〉 (an NjNk eigenstate
with N1 = 2 and N2 = 0), then only the observation 1
occurs as seen by the birds, so P1 = 1 and P2 = 0 by
the No Extra Vision Principle and by the normalization
requirement. Similarly, if b22 = 1, so |ψ〉 = |22〉 (an
NjNk eigenstate with N1 = 0 and N2 = 2), then only
the observation 2 occurs, so then P1 = 0 and P2 = 1. On
the other hand, a state orthogonal to both of these NjNk
eigenstates, |ψ〉 = b12|12〉 + b21|21〉 with b11 = b22 = 0
is an NjNk eigenstate with N1 = N2 = 1 and so by the
Probability Symmetry Principle has P1 = P2, both of
which must be 1/2 to be normalized, obeying Eq. (3.1).
The proof that Born’s rule fails to give this proceeds
by showing that there is no pair of orthogonal projection
operators P1 and P2 in this 4-state system whose expec-
tation values reproduce these probabilities by Born’s rule
Eq. (3.2) for all such quantum states.
For Born’s rule to give, for |ψ〉 = |11〉, P1 = 〈P1〉 ≡
〈ψ|P1|ψ〉 = 〈11|P1|11〉 = 1, the projection operator P1
must have the form |11〉〈11| + P′1 where 〈11|P′1|11〉 =
0. Similarly, for Born’s rule to give, for |ψ〉 = |22〉,
P2 = 〈P2〉 ≡ 〈ψ|P2|ψ〉 = 〈22|P2|22〉 = 1, the projec-
tion operator P2 must have the form |22〉〈22|+P′2 where
〈22|P′2|22〉 = 0.
Furthermore, for Born’s rule to give, for |ψ〉 = |11〉,
P2 = 〈11|P2|11〉 = 0, we need 〈11|P′2|11〉 = 0. Similarly,
for Born’s rule to give, for |ψ〉 = |22〉, P1 = 〈22|P1|22〉 =
0, we need 〈22|P′1|22〉 = 0. Since P1 and P2 are to be or-
thogonal projection operators, P1P1 = P1, P2P2 = P2,
and P1P2 = P2P1 = 0, one can easily show that P
′
1 and
P′2 themselves must be orthogonal projection operators
within the subspace of states of the form b12|12〉+b21|21〉
that are orthogonal to |11〉 and |22〉.
That is, to give the right probabilities for the states
|ψ〉 = |11〉 and |ψ〉 = |22〉 by Born’s rule, and to give
nonzero probabilities when N1 = N2 = 1, the projection
operators must have the form P1 = |11〉〈11|+ |ψ12〉〈ψ12|
and P2 = |22〉〈22|+ |ψ′12〉〈ψ′12| where |ψ12〉 = cos θ|12〉+
sin θeiφ|21〉 and |ψ′12〉 = − sin θe−iφ|12〉 + cos θ|21〉 are
two orthogonal states within the subspace orthogonal to
|11〉 and |22〉, with the two arbitrary real parameters θ
and φ.
So far we have not run into the problem, but now we
do: For a generic NjNk eigenstate with N1 = N2 =
1, |ψ〉 = b12|12〉 + b21|21〉, Born’s rule does not give
P1 = 〈P1〉 = 1/2 or P2 = 〈P2〉 = 1/2. In particular,
if the quantum state has |ψ〉 = |ψ12〉, then 〈P1〉 = 1 and
〈P2〉 = 0 instead of P1 = P2 = 1/2 for this NjNk eigen-
state as required by the Probability Symmetry Principle.
One might object that if one were allowed to choose
the projection operators P1 and P2 after the state is
known, one can avoid the problem altogether. For ex-
ample, if one knows that the quantum state is the par-
ticular NjNk eigenstate with N1 = N2 = 1 that is
|ψ〉 = b12|12〉 + b21|21〉, then with any orthogonal state
|ψ′〉 = b∗21|12〉 − b∗12eiϕ|21〉 one can choose |ψ12〉 =
(|ψ〉 + |ψ′〉)/√2 and |ψ′12〉 = (|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉)/
√
2 to get
P1 = |11〉〈11|+ |ψ12〉〈ψ12| and P2 = |22〉〈22|+ |ψ′12〉〈ψ′12|
that would then give 〈P1〉 = 〈P2〉 = 1/2, in accord
with the Probability Symmetry Principle. However, it
is surely not correct to have to know the quantum state
in order to choose the projection operators whose expec-
tation values in that state are the probabilities. If one
were allowed to do that, one could always choose the or-
thonormal projection operators to give any normalized
set of nonnegative probabilities one wanted, no matter
what the quantum state is. In order for the probabilities
to depend on the quantum state in some reasonable way,
the rule for extracting the probabilities from the state
should not be allowed to depend on the quantum state
in such an ad hoc manner.
One might also object to the Probability Symmetry
Principle, but it seems highly unnatural to give that up.
One could instead just pick a preferred location and then
normalize the relative probabilities for the various obser-
vations to occur there. Even if one had diffeomorphism
invariance so that intrinsically there is no preferred loca-
tion, one might just choose the relative location that, say,
has the smallest rms distance to all other observations,
as seen by the bird. But such ad hoc choices to favor one
location over another certainly seem unlikely to be the
way that nature really works, though one might want to
consider it further before rejecting it completely.
Thus we have seen that if we require that the projec-
tion operators be chosen independently of the quantum
state, and if the observational probabilities are to obey
6the Probability Symmetry Principle (equal probabilities
for different observations that definitely occur an equal
number of times), such probabilities cannot be given by
Born’s rule as the expectation value of the projection op-
erators, Eq. (3.2), if we allow states with more than one
observation actually occurring that are not just quantum
alternatives.
Thus one needs a formula different from Born’s rule for
normalized frog probabilities of a mutually exclusive and
exhaustive set of possible observations, when distinct ob-
servations within the complete set cannot be described by
orthogonal projection operators. Here, by an ‘exhaustive’
set of possible observations, I mean all that can be locally
distinguished by the frogs, without considering the dis-
tinctions that the birds may see by being able to identify
the different locations (different distant surroundings) of
the copies of the laboratories and observers.
V. COMPARISON WITH CLASSICAL THEORY
One might note that conceptually this problem is not
peculiar to quantum theory. If one has a classical the-
ory, one might say that the analogue of the expectation
values of projection operators is the set of 0’s and 1’s for
whether something does not occur or does occur in the
classical behavior. One might then say that the analogue
of Born’s rule in classical theory is that the probability
is 0 for something that does not occur and 1 for some-
thing that does occur. This is fine for the view of a
bird that can see the entire classical behavior and can
see whether or not something occurs. However, for the
view of a frog within the classical universe that cannot
see the whole thing, one wants normalized probabilities
for the frog observations. If more than one observation
can occur within the classical behavior, then they cannot
have normalized probabilities that are each 1. One might
take the number of times a particular observation occurs
(or the time interval during which it occurs, if it occurs
continuously over a finite range of time) and divide by
the total for all possible observations to get a normalized
probability for the particular observation, but if there are
more than one actual observations, this normalized prob-
ability for the observation is not 1 and so is not given by
the classical analogue of Born’s rule as the expectation
value of a projection operator.
Perhaps the problem is so obvious in classical theory
that few would propose that normalized probabilities for
a set of possible observations in classical theory would all
be 0’s or 1’s if they considered cases in which more than
one observation can actually occur. But in quantum the-
ory, the expectation values of projection operators can be
anywhere between 0 and 1 inclusive, so perhaps it was
not so obvious that there also one cannot use these expec-
tation values as normalized probabilities for observations
if more than one can actually occur.
Another reason why this problem was not widely recog-
nized is that what we can see of the universe is so small, in
some sense, that most macroscopic systems within it are
complex enough to be unique within the limited part of
the universe we can observe. Atoms and small molecules
of course are not complex enough to be unique within
what we can see; we believe there are billions of identical
atoms and molecules within each of us. However, even
objects as small as snowflakes have far, far more possible
configurations (presumably very roughly the exponential
of some not-too-small fractional power, perhaps 2/3, of
the number of molecules, say 1020, in a snowflake, I would
guess at least exp 1010 possible molecular configurations
if the fractional power is not smaller than one half) than
the number of particles in the observable part of the uni-
verse (which is much, much less than exp 102.5, which is
roughly the exponential of the one-eighth power of the
number of molecules in a snowflake; surely the fractional
power is not so small as one eighth). Therefore, it is plau-
sible that no two snowflakes in our part of the universe
are identical.
(There may be some snowflake configurations, such as
some precisely regular crystals, that are so much more
probable than the average irregular configurations that
it is conceivable that more than one of them might occur
within the observable universe. I simply do not know
the probabilities for such perfect crystals with a defi-
nite symmetric arrangement of water molecules, which
by minimizing the energy would maximize the probabil-
ity for a microscopic configuration in a thermal state.
However, it is surely the case that most snowflakes are
sufficiently irregular that it is highly improbable that any
others of those have the same microscopic arrangements
of molecules, say using the quantum criterion that the
trace of the product of the density matrices for the rela-
tive locations of the hydrogen and oxygen nuclei within
the two snowflakes is greater than, say, one half, to avoid
the objections of those who might say no two snowflakes
at different locations would have exactly the same quan-
tum state in the sense of having exactly the same density
matrices, with exactly the same probabilities of all the
excited energy eigenstates.)
With much of what we can see being very likely unique
within our observable universe, when one ignores the pos-
sibility that the universe extends far beyond what we can
see, one can also ignore the possibility that our observa-
tion, at least if it is sufficiently detailed, occurs more than
once. However, when we consider the possibility that the
universe is exponentially larger than what we can see of
it (either from a model of an infinite universe, such as a
simply connected k = −1 Friedmann-Robertson-Walker
model, or from a finite model that has been expanded
to enormously large sizes by inflation), we must face the
possibility that a local observation by a frog, no mat-
ter how detailed, may not be unique from the bird per-
spective. Then from the bird perspective, the different
observations are not mutually exclusive, so the sum of
their probabilities within the bird perspective can exceed
unity. However, from the frog perspective, its observa-
tion is a unique realization out of the set of possible frog
7observations, so we frogs want normalizable probabilities
for our possible frog observations. This discrepancy be-
tween the exclusivity of the observations from the frog
perspective and their mutual compatibility from the bird
perspective is what prevents the frog probabilities from
all being 0 or 1 in classical theory and from being ex-
pectation values of orthonormal projection operators in
quantum theory. It may be that the Born rule works for
the birds, but it does not work for us frogs.
VI. EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT
OBSERVATIONAL PROBABILITIES FOR THE
SAME QUANTUM STATE
Let us demonstrate the logical freedom in the rules
for the observational probabilities Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) by
exhibiting various examples of what they might be. For
simplicity, let us restrict attention to theories Ti that all
give the same pure quantum state |ψ〉, which in the toy
model above with different regions at one moment of time
can be written as the superposition given by Eqs. (4.1)
and (4.2), i.e., as
|ψ〉 =
∞∑
N=0
aN |ψN 〉
=
∞∑
N=0
aN
∑
µ1,µ2,...,µN
bµ1µ2...µN |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 (6.1)
in terms of the bird eigenstates |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 in which
the first of the N regions has µ1 = 0 if no observation
occurs there or µ1 = j if the observation Oj occurs there,
and similarly for all other regions L up to N for each N .
As an example of such a state that I shall use to com-
pare the results of the various replacements of Born’s rule
is the following superposition of two bird eigenstates of
different sizes:
|ψ〉 = cos θ|m0;m1;m2〉+ sin θ|n0;n1;n2〉, (6.2)
where |m0;m1;m2〉means the bird eigenstate with Nm =
m0+m1+m2 regions such that µL = 0 (no observation)
for the first m0 regions, 0 ≤ L ≤ m0, µL = 1 (the obser-
vation O1) in the nextm1 regions,m0+1 ≤ L ≤ m0+m1,
and µL = 2 (the observation O2) in the last m2 re-
gions, m0 + m1 + 1 ≤ L ≤ Nm = m0 + m1 + m2,
and where, similarly, |n0;n1;n2〉 means the bird eigen-
state with Nn = n0 + n1 + n2 regions such that µL = 0
for the first n0 regions, µL = 1 in the next n1 regions,
and µL = 2 in the last n2 regions. To illustrate some
points I wish to make below, unless stated otherwise I
shall assume the generic case in which none of the inte-
gers m0,m1,m2, n0, n1, and n2 are zero or are equal to
each other.
Let us suppose that PLµ is a complete set of orthogonal
projection operators for the region L, either for there to
be no observation (µ = 0) in that region or else for the
observationOj to occur (µ = j) there, soP
L
µP
L
ν = δµνP
L
µ
(no sum over µ) and
∑
µP
L
µ = I, the identity operator.
(In a more realistic model, I would not assume that any of
these projection operators is rank one, having only pure
state eigenstates, so they would not pick out a unique
basis, but in my toy model I am assuming that the state
in each region is given uniquely by the value of µ there for
the bird eigenstates.) For simplicity, I am also assuming
that all of the different regions are spacelike separated
(e.g., are at the same time), so that the Hilbert space
for each number of regions N is the tensor product of
the Hilbert spaces for each region. Thus I am assuming
that eachPLµ (which acts on the full quantum state in the
tensor product) acts nontrivially only on its region L and
acts trivially (as the identity) on all the other regions. In
particular, this means that not only do all of the PLµ with
the same L commute with each other by their relation as
a complete set of orthonormal projection operators, but
also all of the PLµ for different L commute with each other
as well.
If the quantum state were the size eigenstate |ψN 〉,
then the bird quantum probability that the observation
Oj occurs in the region L (in the view of the bird that
can tell what the region L is) would be
pNLj = 〈ψN |PLj |ψN 〉. (6.3)
However, in reality, even just in the component state
|ψN 〉 for N > 1, there are other regions where the ob-
servation could occur, so the frog-view probability Pj(i)
for the observation Oj in the theory Ti can be some i-
dependent function of all the pNLj ’s. The freedom of this
function is part of the independence of the observational
probabilities from the quantum state itself.
The frog probabilities logically need not even be func-
tions of the bird probabilities. However, at least in my
toy model of a universe with separate regions at one mo-
ment of time, so that all the projection operators defined
above (which the birds can observe) commute, it seems
plausible that they would be. (It is a further challenge
to describe what happens when frog observations occur
at different times, so that the corresponding projection
operators in the bird view do not commute, but I shall
not address this issue here.)
In particular, I shall assume the No Extra Vision Prin-
ciple, that if for all N and L, the bird quantum proba-
bility pNLj in theory Ti is zero for some j, then the frog
probability Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) is also zero for that j. I
shall also continue to assume the Probability Symmetry
Principle. For my simplified toy example state given by
Eq. (6.2), the PSP would imply that if θ = 0, so the
state were a single bird eigenstate, and if this state had
m1 = m2 (equal numbers of regions with the observa-
tions O1 and O2 that are each assumed to occur once and
only once within each respective region), then the frog
probabilities for these two different observations would
be equal, P1 = P2 = 1/2, with the value of 1/2 deter-
mined by the fact that in this simplified bird eigenstate
there is zero bird probability for any other observation
(and hence, by the NEVP assumption, zero frog proba-
8bility Pj also), so P1 and P2 must sum to unity to obey
the normalization condition Eq. (3.1).
Although I am arguing that Born’s rule is not sufficient
for determining the frog probabilities from the quantum
state, it is surely the case that whatever the rule is, the
resulting probabilities will depend in some way on the
quantum state as well. The PSP and NEVP assumptions
above seem to be rather natural minimal requirements for
this dependence. Now I want to give several examples,
T1–T9, illustrating the freedom of the rule within these
minimal restrictions, and with a subset of these examples,
T3–T5, satisfying one other natural restriction.
A useful procedure for getting normalized frog proba-
bilities Pj(i) for theory Ti is first to define some method
for getting unnormalized nonnegative relative frog prob-
abilities pj(i) and then simply normalize them by Pj(i) =
pj(i)/
∑
k pk(i). So in the following examples, I shall give
examples of rules for calculating relative frog probabili-
ties pj(i) from the bird probabilities pNLj that require
the bird’s knowledge of the size N and region label L
that the frogs do not have. The different indices i will
denote different theories, in this case different rules for
calculating the probabilities, since for simplicity we are
assuming that all the theories have the same quantum
state |ψ〉 and hence the same set of bird probabilities
pNLj.
Next, let us turn to different possible examples.
(1) For theory T1, use the No Extra Vision assumption
to take the relative frog probability to be zero, pj(1) = 0,
if all the pNLj are zero for all N and L for that j, so
that the birds have zero quantum probability to see any
frogs making the observation Oj , but set pj(1) = 1 for
each frog observation Oj that has at least one positive
pNLj for that j. One might interpret this pj(1) to be the
‘existence probability’ of the observation Oj in the Ev-
erett many worlds interpretation of the quantum state.
That is, theory T1 is essentially taking the Everett many
worlds interpretation to imply that if there is any nonzero
amplitude for the observation to occur, it definitely ex-
ists somewhere in the many worlds (and hence has ex-
istence probability unity). If the total number of obser-
vations that have nonzero amplitudes (at least one pos-
itive bird probability pNLj for each such j) is M1, then
the normalized frog probabilities in this theory T1 are
Pj(1) = pj(1)/M1. This would be the theory that ev-
ery observation that actually does exist, as seen by the
birds who look at the entire many-worlds quantum state,
is equally probable, and that the observations that have
zero bird quantum probabilities in all components of the
many-worlds quantum state do not exist for the frogs
either and hence have zero frog probabilities Pj(1).
The problem with this theory T1 is that for almost all
quantum states, almost all observations will exist in the
Everett sense, making their number M1 nearly as large
as the number of all possible observations, which I am
assuming is enormous. Then the normalized frog prob-
abilities Pj(1) = pj(1)/M1 will all be very tiny, giving
extremely low likelihood to the theory T1. Thus, in a
Bayesian analysis, unless one assigned this theory a prior
probability very near unity in comparison with the priors
one assigned to theories having much higher likelihoods,
it seems that surely this theory would have extremely low
posterior probability. Therefore, I strongly suspect that
other theories can be constructed that would be much
more probably true, given our ordered observations that
do not appear as if they have been randomly chosen with
equal probabilities from a set of nearly all possible obser-
vations.
(2) For theory T2, one might try to hang onto Born’s
rule as closely as possible by constructing the global pro-
jection operator
Pj = I−
∏
L
(I−PLj ) (6.4)
and using it in Eq. (3.2) to get, not the normalized frog
probabilities Pj(2) (since these expectation values will
not be normalized), but rather to get the relative frog
probabilities pj(2) = 〈Pj〉 = 〈ψ|Pj |ψ〉. This would not
be the full many-worlds existence probability 0 or 1 de-
scribed for theory T1 (which would be 0 if pj(2) = 0 and
1 if pj(2) > 0), but it might be regarded as the quan-
tum probability for a superobserver (a bird) to find that
at least one instance of the observation Oj occurs if one
imagines the bird making a quantum observation of all
the frog observers in the quantum state |ψ〉.
Indeed, this pj(2) is essentially in quantum language
[5] what Hartle and Srednicki [3] propose for the prob-
ability of an observation (without making the distinc-
tion between bird probabilities and frog probabilities),
the quantum probability that the observation occurs at
least somewhere. This is fine for bird probabilities for the
existence of observations that for them are not mutually
exclusive. However, because the different Pj ’s defined
this way are not orthogonal, the resulting quantum prob-
abilities pj(2) given by Born’s rule will not be normalized
to obey Eq. (3.1). This lack of normalization is a con-
sequence of the fact that even though it is assumed that
two different observations Oj and Ok (with j 6= k) can-
not both occur within the same region L, one can have
Oj occurring within one region and Ok occurring within
another region. Therefore, the existence of the observa-
tion Oj at least somewhere is not incompatible with the
existence of the distinct observation Ok somewhere else,
so the sum of the bird quantum existence probabilities
pj(2) is not constrained to be unity. Thus they cannot
be used directly as the normalized frog probabilities.
However, it would be perfectly legal to interpret
the unnormalized pj(2)’s as relative probabilities for
the frogs, and from them construct the correspond-
ing normalized probabilities Pj(2) = pj(2)/
∑
k pk(2) =
pj(2)/M2 for the frogs, with M2 =
∑
k pk(2). This is
what I am defining theory T2 to do.
This theory T2 seems likely to have a higher likelihood
than T1, since presumably there will be many of the M1
observations that have pj(2) > 0 and hence pj(1) = 1
but yet have pj(2)≪ 1, so that M2 =
∑
k pk(2) is signif-
9icantly smaller than M1, at least in absolute terms (that
is, I would assume that generically M1 −M2 ≫ 1 if the
number of possible observations is very large), though it
would depend on the quantum state and the set of projec-
tion operators PLj whether or not M2 is relatively much
smaller than M1, M2/M1 ≪ 1. If indeed M2/M1 ≪ 1,
and if our observations are an example of an Oj with
pj(2) near unity, then Pj(2) ≫ Pj(1), so our observa-
tions would assign a much higher likelihood to theory T2
than to T1. However, I still suspect that the universe may
be so large that a huge number of observations may have
a bird quantum probability near unity to occur at least
somewhere, so that not onlyM1 but alsoM2 would be so
large that the resulting likelihood Pj(2) = pj(2)/M2 for
theory T2 would also be enormously lower than that for
other theories of similar elegance (and hence presumably
to be assigned similar prior probabilities) that one may
be able to construct.
For the next sequence of rules from extracting frog ob-
servational probabilities from a given quantum state, I
shall assume the
Probability Fraction Principle (PFP):
If the quantum state has a definite fraction for the
ratio of each possible observation to the total number
of all possible observations, then the probability of each
observation is that fraction.
In a restriction of our toy model in which the quantum
state |ψ〉 is a single bird eigenstates |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 with
either zero or one definite observation within each region,
let
Nj =
N∑
L=1
pNLj
=
N∑
L=1
〈µ1µ2 . . . µN |PLj |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 (6.5)
be the number of observations Oj (the number of re-
gions containing this particular observation, each region
assumed to contain at most one observation). Further,
let
NO =
∑
j
Nj =
N∑
L=1
∑
j
pNLj
=
N∑
L=1
∑
j
〈µ1µ2 . . . µN |PLj |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉
=
N∑
L=1
〈µ1µ2 . . . µN |PLO|µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 (6.6)
be the total number of all observations (the total number
of regions N minus the number of regions with µL =
0 or no observation), where PLO =
∑
j P
L
j is the total
projection operator onto having any observation at all
(regardless of which particular Oj it is) in the region L.
Since each bird eigenstate has a definite value of each Nj
and ofNO, it has the definite fraction fj = Nj/NO for the
observation Oj . If the full quantum state were only this
single bird eigenstate, the Probability Fraction Principle
would imply that the probability of the observation Oj
is that fraction, Pj = fj .
The Probability Fraction Principle also implies that
if the full quantum state is a superposition of different
bird eigenstates with the same fractions fj = Nj/NO for
each (though the Nj and NO need not be the same for
all component bird eigenstates, only their ratio), then
Pj = fj . That is, the quantum state need not be an
eigenstate of all the numbers of observations Nj , but
only of their ratios. For example, the quantum state
of Eq. (6.2) for general θ (a superposition of two bird
eigenstates, |m0;m1;m2〉 with N1 = m1 and N2 = m2
and |n0;n1;n2〉 with N1 = n1 and N2 = n2, with dif-
ferent values of N1 and of N2) is not an eigenstate of
N1 and of N2 but would be an eigenstate of the frac-
tions f1 = N1/(N1 + N2) and of f2 = N2/(N1 + N2) if
m1/n1 = m2/n2. For such an eigenstate of the fractions,
the Probability Fraction Principle implies that P1 = f1
and P2 = f2.
Note that the Probability Fraction Principle implies
the Probability Symmetry Principle but not conversely,
so that the Probability Fraction Principle is a stronger
principle. For example, theories T1 and T2 satisfy the
PSP but not the PFP, as one can see for the superpo-
sition above that is a fraction eigenstate with f1 6= f2:
both T1 and T2 give P1 = 1/2 6= f1 and P2 = 1/2 6= f2.
This fact might be taken as another possible reason for
rejecting theories T1 and T2 (or for assigning them low
prior probabilities, though I argued above that I suspect
they would end up with low posterior probabilities any-
way just from their low likelihoods if indeed there are
a huge number of possible observations that T1 and T2
would assign nearly equal, and hence very low, probabil-
ities Pj , with the particular Pj that the theory assigns to
our observation to be used as the likelihood of the theory
in a Bayesian analysis).
After imposing the Probability Fraction Principle, the
main remaining freedom in the rule for assigning obser-
vation probabilities from the quantum state is how to
weight different components of the quantum state with
different fractions fj that have different numbers of re-
gions N and/or different numbers of observations NO
(and hence also with possibly different numbers N −NO
of regions with no observations). For example, differ-
ent weightings below can correspond to the difference
between using volume weighting or not in inflationary
cosmology [6].
(3) For theory T3, corresponding to volume weighting,
let the unnormalized relative probabilities pj(3) be the
expectation values of the numbers Nj of times the obser-
vation Oj occurs, so
pj(3) =
∑
L
〈ψ|PLj |ψ〉 =
∞∑
N=1
N∑
L=1
|aN |2pNLj. (6.7)
Then, as always, normalize these to get the normalized
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observational probabilities
Pj(3) =
pj(3)∑
k pk(3)
. (6.8)
(4) For theory T4, corresponding to volume averag-
ing, let the unnormalized relative probabilities pj(4) be
the expectation values of the fraction of regions Nj/N in
which the observation Oj occurs (out of all N regions,
not just out of the regions with observations), so
pj(4) =
∞∑
N=1
1
N
N∑
L=1
|aN |2pNLj, (6.9)
then giving normalized observational probabilities
Pj(4) =
pj(4)∑
k pk(4)
. (6.10)
Theory T3 in its sum over L weights each component
state |ψN 〉 by the number of observational regions in
which the observation Oj occurs. On the other hand,
theory T4 has an average over L for each total number
N of regions, so that component states |ψN 〉 with larger
N do not tend to dominate the probabilities for observa-
tions just because of the greater number of observation
regions within them. Theory T3 is analogous to volume
weighting in the cosmological measure, and theory T4 is
analogous to volume averaging [6].
(5) For theory T5, which might be said to be obser-
vational averaging, let the unnormalized relative prob-
abilities pj(5) be the expectation values of the fraction
of observations, fj = Nj/NO, in which the observation
Oj occurs (out of just the NO regions with observations
in each eigenstate of the total number NO of all regions
with one observation), so
pj(5) =
∞∑
N=1
|aN |2
∑
µ1,µ2,...,µN
|bµ1µ2...µN |2
Nj
NO
(6.11)
with
Nj
NO
=
〈µ1µ2 . . . µN |PLj |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉
〈µ1µ2 . . . µN |PLO|µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉
. (6.12)
This then leads to the normalized observational prob-
abilities
Pj(5) =
pj(5)∑
k pk(5)
. (6.13)
Theory T5 would correspond to the procedure of col-
lapsing the full quantum state |ψ〉 to one of its bird eigen-
states |µ1µ2 . . . µN 〉 with probability given by the abso-
lute square of its amplitude, |aN |2|bµ1µ2...µN |2, and then
saying in that bird eigenstate the probability of the ob-
servation Oj is the corresponding fraction fj = Nj/NO
of all observations that are type j.
In [63] I implicitly assumed that theory T3 is the prob-
ability rule in Everett many-worlds quantum theory and
that theory T5 is the probability rule in collapse versions
of quantum theory. Then I pointed out that in principle
from these two different probability distributions for ob-
servations, one could test between these two versions of
quantum theory. I still think that T3 would be a more
natural rule than T5 in Everett many-worlds quantum
theory, and that T5 is the most natural rule in collapse
versions of quantum theory (assuming that the collapse is
to a bird eigenstate with a definite observation, or none at
all, in each region), but I no longer believe that T3 is the
only possible rule within Everett many-worlds quantum
theory. Although T5 would naturally arise within col-
lapse versions of quantum theory, it is logically possible
it could also arise in many-worlds versions. Therefore,
whereas I would now say that finding that T3 (or T4)
gives much higher probability for our observation than
T5 would tend to support many-worlds over collapse, it
is no longer obvious to me that finding that T5 gives
much higher probabilities for our observation than T3 or
T4 would necessarily support collapse versions of quan-
tum theory over many-worlds versions without collapse.
Except for theory T1, all of the rules above may
be viewed as modifications of Born’s rule, Eq. (3.2),
by replacing the projection operators Pj with some
other observation operators Qj(i) normalized so that∑
j〈Qj(i)〉i = 1, giving
Pj(i) = 〈Qj(i)〉i. (6.14)
Of course, one also wants Pj(i) ≥ 0 for each i and j, so
one needs to impose the requirement that the expectation
value of each observation operator Qj(i) in each theory
Ti be nonnegative. The simplest way to do this would
be to require that each observation operator Qj(i) be a
positive operator. However, since a complete theory must
both specify the quantum state (here denoted by 〈. . .〉i,
the linear map from operators, replacing the . . . in this
expression, to complex numbers that are the quantum
expectation values of the operators in the quantum state)
and specify the observation operatorsQj(i), it is logically
possible that the observation operatorsQj(i) need not be
positive but just have positive expectation values in the
quantum state 〈. . .〉i for the same theory Ti.
The main point [5, 6, 7] of this paper is that in cases
with more than one copy of the observer, such as in a
large enough universe, one cannot simply use the expec-
tation values of projection operators as the probabilities
of observations. This means that if Eq. (6.14) is to apply,
each theory must assign a set of observation operators
Qj(i), corresponding to the set of possible observations
Oj , that are not projection operators, whose expectation
values are used instead as the probabilities of the obser-
vations. Since these observation operators are not given
directly by the formalism of traditional quantum theory
(e.g., as projection operators by Born’s rule), they must
be added to that formalism by each particular complete
theory.
In other words, a complete theory Ti cannot be given
merely by the dynamical equations and initial conditions
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(the quantum state), but it also requires the set of obser-
vation operators Qj(i) whose expectation values are the
probabilities of the observations Oj in the complete set
of possible observations by the localized observers (frogs)
within the universe. (Alternatively, they may be given by
some other rule for the probabilities, if they are not to
be expectation values of operators.) The probabilities
are not given purely by the quantum state but have their
own logical independence in a complete theory.
For the theories T2–T5, we can write the observation
operators Qj(i) in the following forms, with 〈Q〉i =
〈ψ|Q|ψ〉 when the quantum state is the pure state |ψ〉
for all of the theories Ti under consideration, as we have
been taking it to be in this paper:
Qj(2)=
Pj
〈∑k Pk〉i ,
Qj(3)=
∑
LP
L
j
〈∑k∑LPLk 〉i ,
Qj(4)=
∑
∞
N=1
1
N
∑N
L=1 PNP
L
j PN
〈∑k∑∞N=1 1N ∑NL=1 PNPLkPN 〉i
,
Qj(5)=
∑
∞
N=1
∑N
NO=1
∑N
L=1
1
NO
PNNOP
L
j PNNO
〈∑k∑∞N=1∑NNO=1∑NL=1 1NOPNNOPLkPNNO〉i
,
(6.15)
where PN = |ψN 〉〈ψN | is the projection operator onto
the component state with N total regions, and PNNO
is the projection operator onto the state with N total
regions and NO regions with observations. The expec-
tation values of the numerators of these expressions are
the relative probabilities pj(i), and the expectation val-
ues of the full expressions are the normalized probabili-
ties Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) for the observations Oj made by
the localized observers (frogs) within the universe that
do not have access to the bird’s eye view of where they
are within the universe or of how many observations of
the various types occur within it.
Besides T1, we can have other theories in which the
observational probabilities Pj(i) are not given by the ex-
pectation value of any observation operatorsQj(i) chosen
independent of the quantum state (up to normalization).
For example, the relative probabilities pj(i) may be given
nonlinearly in terms of quantum expectation values.
(6) For theory T6, let
pj(6) = 〈Pj〉c = 〈ψ|[I−
∏
L
(I−PLj )]|ψ〉c = pj(2)c (6.16)
and then get the normalized observational probabilities
Pj(6) =
pj(6)∑
k pk(6)
, (6.17)
where the exponent c is an arbitrary positive constant
here and below.
(7) For theory T7, let
pj(7) = 〈
∑
L
PLj 〉c = 〈ψ|
∑
L
PLj |ψ〉c = pj(3)c, (6.18)
and then
Pj(7) =
pj(7)∑
k pk(7)
. (6.19)
(8) For theory T8, let
pj(8) = 〈
∑
L
∞∑
N=1
1
N
N∑
L=1
PNP
L
j PN 〉c = pj(4)c, (6.20)
and then
Pj(8) =
pj(8)∑
k pk(8)
. (6.21)
(9) For theory T9, let
pj(9) = 〈
∞∑
N=1
N∑
NO=1
N∑
L=1
1
NO
PNNOP
L
j PNNO〉c = pj(5)c,
(6.22)
and then
Pj(9) =
pj(9)∑
k pk(9)
. (6.23)
The theories T6–T9 are the nonlinear generalizations of
T2–T5 respectively and reduce to those linear probability
rules for c = 1.
Let us write what these nine rules would give for the
quantum state of Eq. (6.2), |ψ〉 = cos θ|m0;m1;m2〉 +
sin θ|n0;n1;n2〉. Let me also choose numbers for the pa-
rameters of this state to represent very crudely an equal-
amplitude (cos θ = sin θ = 1/
√
2) superposition of the
present observable part of the universe and of what that
part may become after a time of 1056 times its present
age, where the precise value of this time is not impor-
tant but here is taken as the time by which it would be
probable for our asymptotically de Sitter region to have
decayed if one uses the first number in Eq. (89) of [56] as
the decay rate per four-volume.
A human brain has a volume of about 10101 Planck
volumes, and the observable universe today has a volume
of about 10185 Planck volumes, or about 1084 times the
volume of a human brain, so if we divide up the present
universe into brain-sized regions, we will get of the order
of 1084 regions, of which of the order of 1010 are occupied
by human brains. I shall let O1 represent an ordinary
human observation, and O2 represent an observation by
a Boltzmann brain [3, 4, 5, 6, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85,
86, 87, 88, 89, 90]. The probability per human brain
volume of a Boltzmann brain is very low, say 10−10
42
[71] for concreteness, so this probability is negligible in
the present observable part of the universe. Therefore, let
us say that the number of regions of the first component
of the quantum state (the present observable universe)
with no observations is m0 = 10
84, the number with an
ordinary human observation O1 is m1 = 10
10, and the
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number with a Boltzmann brain observation O2 is m2 =
0.
The second component of the quantum state, roughly
1056 Hubble times to the future, will have a volume (as-
suming an asymptotically exponential de Sitter growth
at the rate given by the present value of the cosmologi-
cal constant) very roughly 1010
56
times that of a human
brain, so I shall take the number of regions without any
observations then to be n0 = 10
1056 . Stars and ordinary
observers will have almost entirely died out by then, so
I shall take the number of ordinary human observations
then to be n1 = 0. Boltzmann brains might occupy a
fraction of the universe then that is very roughly 10−10
42
,
but by then the universe will have expanded so enor-
mously large that the total expected number of Boltz-
mann brains will be huge, giving the number of Boltz-
mann brain observations to be, say, n2 = 10
1056−1042 .
For simplicity I am ignoring all other observations but
the ordinary human and Boltzmann brain observations
O1 and O2 respectively. Note that here I have abandoned
the generic case by setting m2 = n1 = 0.
Now let us see what the nine rules, theories T1–T9, give
for the probabilities P1(i) and P2(i) for observations O1
and O2 for each of the nine value of i.
(1) Theory T1, that each observation has equal prob-
ability if it has a nonzero amplitude, gives unnormal-
ized relative probabilities p1(1) = p2(1) = 1 and normal-
ized observational probabilities P1(1) = P2(1) = 1/2, the
same for ordinary human and Boltzmann brain observa-
tions. If one considered all possible observations rather
than just these two, theory T1 would assign a very low
probability for all of them, so the likelihood that this the-
ory is right would be very low, where ‘likelihood’ is used
with the standard technical meaning of being the con-
ditional probability Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) of our observation
Oj , conditional upon the theory Ti.
(2) Theory T2, that each observation has a relative
(frog) probability that is the same as the bird probability
for that observation to exist at least somewhere, would
give p1(2) = cos
2 θ (since only the first component, with
amplitude cos θ, gives rise to the human observation O1
and then with certainty if the state were that compo-
nent) and p2(2) = sin
2 θ (since only the second compo-
nent, with amplitude sin θ, gives rise to the Boltzmann
brain observation O2 and then with certainty if the state
were that component). Since these are already normal-
ized (because of the special case that m2 = n1 = 0), the
normalized frog observational probabilities are the same.
For our choice of equal amplitudes, cos θ = sin θ = 1/
√
2,
we get P1(2) = P2(2) = 1/2, in this case the same as
theory T1. If one considered all possible observations and
labeled our observation as O1, then because there may be
some observations that are unlikely to occur anywhere,
one would have P1(2) somewhat larger than P1(1) from
theory T1, but still P1(2) is likely to be so small that
theory T2, as well as theory T1, would be assigned very
low likelihood as a result of our observation.
(3) Theory T3, that the relative frog observation prob-
abilities are the expected numbers of such observations
(the analogue of volume weighting in the cosmological
measure problem [6]) would give p1(3) = m1 cos
2 θ +
n1 sin
2 θ = 0.5× 1010 and p2(3) = m2 cos2 θ+n2 sin2 θ =
0.5 × 101056−1042 . Then the normalized probabilities
would be
P1(3) =
m1 cos
2 θ + n1 sin
2 θ
(m1 +m2) cos2 θ + (n1 + n2) sin
2 θ
∼ 10−(1056−1042−10),
P2(3) =
m2 cos
2 θ + n2 sin
2 θ
(m1 +m2) cos2 θ + (n1 + n2) sin
2 θ
≈ 1. (6.24)
Theory T3 has the huge numerical dominance of the
expectation value for the number of Boltzmann brains re-
sult in their huge dominance for the observational prob-
abilities, so that the probability for the human obser-
vation O1 is minuscule. Our ordinary human observa-
tion would give extremely low likelihood to this the-
ory, so unless one gave it very nearly all of the prior
probability to be correct before considering our obser-
vation, it would be statistically ruled out by our ob-
servation at an enormously high confidence level. This
is a manifestation of the Boltzmann brain problem
[3, 4, 5, 6, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90].
(4) Theory T4, that the relative frog observation prob-
abilities are the expectation values of the fraction of re-
gions in which in observation occurs (the analogue of vol-
ume averaging in the cosmological measure problem [6])
would give the relative probabilities
p1(4) =
m1 cos
2 θ
m0 +m1 +m2
+
n1 sin
2 θ
n0 + n1 + n2
∼ 0.5× 10−74,
p2(4) =
m2 cos
2 θ
m0 +m1 +m2
+
n2 sin
2 θ
n0 + n1 + n2
∼ 0.5× 10−1042 . (6.25)
This then gives the normalized probabilities
P1(4) =
m1 cos
2 θ
m0+m1+m2
+ n1 sin
2 θ
n0+n1+n2
(m1+m2) cos2 θ
m0+m1+m2
+ (n1+n2) sin
2 θ
n0+n1+n2
≈ 1,
P2(4) =
m2 cos
2 θ
m0+m1+m2
+ n2 sin
2 θ
n0+n1+n2
(m1+m2) cos2 θ
m0+m1+m2
+ (n1+n2) sin
2 θ
n0+n1+n2
∼ 10−(1042−74). (6.26)
In theory T4 the volume averaging greatly suppresses
the Boltzmann brains, since they are so dilute in the far
future component of the quantum state, much more di-
lute than human brains are in our present component of
the quantum state. Therefore, almost all of the normal-
ized probability is for the ordinary human observation
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O1. Of the simple theories T1–T5 that do not have the
arbitrary exponent c, it would seem that the volume-
averaged T4 gives the most hope for giving the highest
probability for our observation (the likelihood of the the-
ory, to be multiplied by the prior probability of the theory
to get the relative posterior probability of the theory in
a Bayesian analysis).
(5) Theory T5, that the relative frog observation prob-
abilities are the expectation values of the fractions of all
observations that are of the particular type (what might
be said to be observational averaging, or what would
most naturally be given by collapse versions of quantum
theory), would give the relative probabilities
p1(5) =
m1 cos
2 θ
m1 +m2
+
n1 sin
2 θ
n1 + n2
= 0.5,
p2(5) =
m2 cos
2 θ
m1 +m2
+
n2 sin
2 θ
n1 + n2
= 0.5. (6.27)
This then gives the normalized probabilities
P1(5) = P2(5) =
1
2
. (6.28)
This theory T5 is ambivalent whether it makes ordi-
nary human observations or Boltzmann brain observa-
tions more probable. For the particular example used
here, it would give a likelihood very nearly half that of
theory T4, so both of these theories might seem to be
good candidate theories, with likelihoods not too small.
However, if one extended the example to an enormous
superposition of many different quantum states, I would
suspect that most of probability assigned by theory T5
would go to the bulk of the quantum components in
which it seems likely that life would be much more rare
than it is in our component, simply because the condi-
tions are much less conducive for life there. But in the
components in which the conditions are much less con-
ducive for life, I would suspect that life would be quite
different, and nearly all of the observations would have
a significantly different character than ours do. Then it
would seem that our observations would have much lower
probabilities in theory T5 than in theory T4.
In collapse versions of quantum theory, in which the
rule T5 would arise quite naturally, it would seem most
probable that the quantum state would collapse to one of
the presumably many more components in which life is
very rare (on a per-volume basis), and in which most
life that does occur is much very different from ours.
Therefore, it seems likely that our particular observations
would be extremely improbable in this scenario, much
more improbable than they would be in a component of
the quantum state like ours in which many effective cou-
pling constants and other parameters of the local state
seem finely tuned for life and in which life is presumably
not nearly so rare as it would be if the parameters of our
component were not so suitable for life.
Of course, life might be extremely rare, on a per-
volume basis or even a per-planet basis, for all of the
components of the quantum state, but that need not
affect the normalized probabilities of our observations,
since one is necessarily selecting for an observation rather
than just randomly selecting a region of space which may
or may not have an observation. How rare our type of
observation is, out of the volume of space or out of the
number of planets, rather than out of all types of ob-
servations that occur with similar probabilities, does not
affect the likelihoods that our observations impute to the
theories that predict these probabilities. Therefore, it is
of no disadvantage to a theory to predict that life, even
within the component of the quantum state that is most
conducive to life, is extremely rare on a per-volume basis.
What does seem likely to make the probability of our
observation small in the actual quantum state of the uni-
verse (whatever reasonable, i.e., simple, rule is used to
deduce the probabilities from the quantum state) is the
fact that the quantum state seems likely to support a
large number of different observations with roughly equal
number, spatial frequency, or frequency among the set
of all observations. However, one might expect that this
number, although no doubt large, is not nearly so large as
the set of all possible observations, so that the probabil-
ity of an observation within this dominant subset would
be much larger than the probability of an observation
chosen at random, with nearly equal probabilities, from
the set of all possible observations, as theories T1 and T2
seem likely to give.
In theory T4 one could partially explain the apparent
fine tuning as the selection effect of having the proba-
bilities weighted by the density of observations per vol-
ume (at least if the ultimate theory allowed this fine tun-
ing to occur in some components of the quantum state,
which itself might be a nontrivial requirement suggest-
ing design). (The theory T3 could also partially explain
the apparent fine tuning if it did not have the Boltz-
mann brain problem.) Theory T5 does not incorporate
this selection effect, so it would seem that if we want to
explain the apparent fine tuning within our part of the
universe (though not yet explaining an apparent design
of the complete theory of physics that we hope shall pre-
dict quantum components with the local fine tuning), we
should reject theories T1, T2, and T5. If we also reject
theories T6–T9 because of the extra complication of their
exponent c and consider only theories T3 and T4, then it
seems that the Boltzmann brain problem may lead us to
prefer theory T4, which is indeed what I am advocating.
On the other hand, perhaps there is some other solution
of the Boltzmann brain problem that is less complicated
than revising the very simple T3 to the slightly more com-
plicated T4, in which case one might be able to stick with
T3. However, so far I have not seen other solutions to the
Boltzmann brain problem that seem simpler than chang-
ing the volume-weighted T3 to the volume-averaged T4.
Although the theories T6–T9, with their arbitrary ex-
ponent c, seem uglier than the theories T1–T5 (so that I
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personally would assign them lower prior probabilities),
they are further proof of the existence of other possible
rules for extracting normalized frog observational prob-
abilities from the quantum state, so let us continue the
discussion to see what they assign for the two-component
quantum state given by Eq. (6.2).
(6) Theory T6, the nonlinear analogue of T2, gives
the unnormalized relative probabilities p1(6) = p1(2)
c =
cos2c θ = 2−c and p1(6) = p1(2)
c = cos2c θ = 2−c, so for
our quantum state with both components having equal
amplitude, T6 gives P1(6) = P2(6) = 1/2, exactly the
same as theory T2. However, the probabilities would be
different from those of T2 if we had chosen a state with
cos2 θ 6= sin2 θ.
(7) Theory T7, the nonlinear analogue of the
volume-weighted T3, gives the relative probabilities
p1(7) = (m1 cos
2 θ + n1 sin
2 θ)c = (0.5 × 1010)c and
p2(7) = (m2 cos
2 θ + n2 sin
2 θ)c = (0.5 × 101056−1042)c.
Then the normalized probabilities would be P1(7) ∼
10−(10
56
−1042−10)c and P2(7) ∼ 1, again enormously fa-
voring Boltzmann brains over ordinary human brains un-
less c were taken to be extraordinarily small, in which
case the probabilities would revert to those of the highly
nonpredictive theory T1 in the limit of c becoming arbi-
trarily small.
(8) Theory T8, the nonlinear analogue of the volume-
averaged T4, gives the relative probabilities
p1(8) =
(
m1 cos
2 θ
m0 +m1 +m2
+
n1 sin
2 θ
n0 + n1 + n2
)c
∼ (0.5× 10−74)c,
p2(8) =
(
m2 cos
2 θ
m0 +m1 +m2
+
n2 sin
2 θ
n0 + n1 + n2
)c
∼ (0.5× 10−1042)c. (6.29)
Normalizing these then gives the normalized probabilities
P1(8) ≈ 1,
P2(8) ∼ 10−(10
42
−74)c. (6.30)
Again, unless c is extraordinarily tiny, this theory T8
very strongly favors human observations over Boltzmann
brain observations in this toy model. Presumably T8
would give likelihoods close to what T4 gives if c is close
to 1. However, other than as a illustration of the free-
dom that one has in choosing the rules for extracting the
frog observational probabilities from the quantum state,
I do not see much motivation for complicating the simple
linear volume-averaged theory T4 by going to its nonlin-
ear generalization T8, though it is conceivable that a fur-
ther analysis might show that it gives significantly higher
probabilities for our observations, for some suitable c,
than the theory T4 that effectively has c = 1.
(9) Finally, theory T9, the nonlinear analogue of the
observationally-averaged or quantum collapse theory T5,
gives the unnormalized relative probabilities of the frog
observations as
p1(9) =
(
m1 cos
2 θ
m1 +m2
+
n1 sin
2 θ
n1 + n2
)c
= 2−c,
p2(9) =
(
m2 cos
2 θ
m1 +m2
+
n2 sin
2 θ
n1 + n2
)c
= 2−c. (6.31)
Just as the theory T5 did, for our particular two-
component quantum state T9 gives equal normalized
probabilities for the observations,
P1(9) = P2(9) =
1
2
, (6.32)
which again is not very informative and plausibly gives
a very low likelihood for this theory when one goes to
a more realistic model with a huge number of possible
observations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The examples show that there is not just one unique
rule for getting observational probabilities from the quan-
tum state. It remains to be seen what the correct rule is.
Of the four examples given above with linear probability
rules (relative probabilities given by the first power of
the expectation values of certain operators), that is, the-
ories T2–T5, I suspect that with a suitable quantum state,
theory T4 would have the highest likelihood Pj(i), given
our actual observations, since theory T2 would have the
normalized probabilities nearly evenly distributed over a
huge number of possible observations, theory T3 seems
to be plagued by the Boltzmann brain problem [6], and
theory T5 would seem to favor components of the quan-
tum state much more hostile to life than ours and hence
probably having the dominant form of observers quite dif-
ferent from us. Theories T6–T9 can be arbitrarily close to
T2–T5 respectively if c is arbitrarily close to 1, but with
their arbitrary constant c, they seem more complex than
T2–T5 and hence might naturally be assigned lower prior
probabilities. One might conjecture that the fairly sim-
ple theory T4 can be implemented in quantum cosmology
to fit observations better than other alternatives [6].
Thus we see that in a universe with the possibility of
multiple copies of an observer, observational probabili-
ties are not given purely by the quantum state, but also
by a rule to get them from the state. There is logical
freedom in what this rule is (or in what the observation
operators Qj(i) are if the rule is that the probabilities
are the expectation values of these operators). In cos-
mology, finding the correct rule is the measure problem.
Preliminary evidence suggests that the volume-averaged
rule T4 is the best possibility considered so far.
15
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for discussions with Andreas Albrecht,
Tom Banks, Raphael Bousso, Sean Carroll, Brandon
Carter, Alan Guth, Daniel Harlow, James Hartle, Gary
Horowitz, Andrei Linde, Seth Lloyd, Juan Maldacena,
Donald Marolf (who suggested a proof that Born’s rule
does not work), Mahdiyar Noorbala, Mark Srednicki,
Alex Vilenkin, Alexander Westphal, an anonymous ref-
eree, and others, and especially for a long email debate
with Hartle and Srednicki over typicality that led me
to become convinced that there is logical freedom in
the rules for getting observational probabilities from the
quantum state. This research was supported in part by
the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada.
[1] M. Born, Z. Phys. 37, 863-867 (1926).
[2] R. Bousso, JHEP 9907, 004 (1999)
[arXiv:hep-th/9905177]; JHEP 9906, 028 (1999)
[arXiv:hep-th/9906022]; Class. Quant. Grav. 17, 997-
1005 (2000) [arXiv:hep-th/9911002]; Rev. Mod. Phys.
74, 825-874 (2002) [arXiv:hep-th/0203101]; Phys. Rev.
Lett. 90, 121302 (2003) [arXiv:hep-th/0210295]; Phys.
Rev. Lett. 97, 191302 (2006) [arXiv:hep-th/0605263].
[3] J. B. Hartle and M. Srednicki, Phys. Rev. D 75, 123523
(2007) [arXiv:0704.2630].
[4] D. N. Page, “Typicality Defended,” arXiv:0707.4169
[hep-th].
[5] D. N. Page, Phys. Rev. D 78, 023514 (2008)
[arXiv:0804.3592].
[6] D. N. Page, JCAP 0810, 025 (2008) [arXiv:0808.0351
[hep-th]].
[7] D. N. Page, “Insufficiency of the Quantum State for
Deducing Observational Probabilities,” arXiv:0808.0722
[hep-th].
[8] M. Tegmark, Sci. Am 288 (5), 30-41 (2003); Spektrum
Wiss. 2003 (8), 34-45 (2003); Found. Phys. 38, 101-150
(2008), arXiv:0704.0646 [gr-qc]; Nature 448, 23 (2007),
arXiv:0707.2593 [quant-ph]; New Sci. 195 (2621), 38-
41 (2007); “Shut up and Calculate,” arXiv:0709.4024
[physics.pop-ph].
[9] A. Aguirre and M. Tegmark, JCAP 0501, 003 (2005)
[arXiv:hep-th/0409072].
[10] P. Hut, M. Alford, and M. Tegmark, Found. Phys. 36,
765-794 (2006), [arXiv:physics/0510188].
[11] J. Garcia-Bellido, A. D. Linde and D. A. Linde, Phys.
Rev. D 50, 730 (1994) [arXiv:astro-ph/9312039].
[12] A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 846-849 (1995)
[arXiv:gr-qc/9406010].
[13] A. Linde, D. Linde, and A. Mezhlumian, Phys. Rev. D
49, 1783-1826 (1994) [arXiv:gr-qc/9306035].
[14] J. Garcia-Bellido and A. Linde, Phys. Rev. D 51, 429-443
(1995) [arXiv:hep-th/9408023].
[15] A. Linde, D. Linde, and A. Mezhlumian, Phys. Lett. B
345, 203-210 (1995) [arXiv:hep-th/9411111].
[16] A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 52, 3365-3374 (1995)
[arXiv:gr-qc/9505031].
[17] S. Winitzki and A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 53, 4298-4310
(1996) [arXiv:gr-qc/9510054].
[18] A. D. Linde and A. Mezhlumian, Phys. Rev. D 53, 4267-
4274 (1996) [arXiv:gr-qc/9511058].
[19] A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 5501-5504 (1998)
[arXiv:hep-th/9806185].
[20] V. Vanchurin, A. Vilenkin, and S. Winitzki, Phys. Rev.
D 61, 083507 (2000) [arXiv:gr-qc/9905097].
[21] A. H. Guth, Phys. Rept. 333, 555-574 (2000)
[arXiv:astro-ph/0002156].
[22] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 64, 023507
(2001) [arXiv:gr-qc/0102090].
[23] G. F. R. Ellis, U. Kirchner, and W. R. Stoeger,
S.J., Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. 347, 921-936 (2004)
[arXiv:astro-ph/0305292].
[24] W. R. Stoeger, G. F. R. Ellis, and U. Kirchner,
“Multiverses and Cosmology: Philosophical Issues,”
arXiv:astro-ph/0407329.
[25] M. Tegmark, JCAP 0504, 001 (2005)
[arXiv:astro-ph/0410281].
[26] A. Aguirre, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by
B. J. Carr (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2007), pp. 367-386 [arXiv:astro-ph/0506519].
[27] G. Ellis, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by B. J. Carr
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), pp. 387-
409.
[28] D. N. Page, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by
B. J. Carr (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2007), pp. 411-429 [arXiv:hep-th/0610101].
[29] J. Garriga, D. Schwartz-Perlov, A. Vilenkin,
and S. Winitzki, JCAP 0601, 017 (2006)
[arXiv:hep-th/0509184].
[30] R. Easther, E. A. Lim, and M. R. Martin, JCAP 0603,
016 (2006) [arXiv:astro-ph/0511233].
[31] R. Bousso, B. Freivogel, and M. Lippert, Phys. Rev. D
74, 046008 (2006) [arXiv:hep-th/0603105].
[32] R. Bousso, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 191302 (2006)
[arXiv:hep-th/0605263].
[33] A. Ceresole, G. Dall’Agata, A. Giryavets, R. Kallosh,
and A. Linde, Phys. Rev. D 74, 086010 (2006)
[arXiv:hep-th/0605266].
[34] R. Bousso, B. Freivogel, and I-S. Yang, Phys. Rev. D 74,
103516 (2006) [arXiv:hep-th/0606114].
[35] G. W. Gibbons and N. Turok, Phys. Rev. D 77, 063516
(2008) [arXiv:hep-th/0609095].
[36] A. Vilenkin, J. Phys. A 40, 6777-6785 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0609193].
[37] A. Aguirre, S. Gratton, and M. C. Johnson, Phys. Rev.
D 75, 123501 (2007) [arXiv:hep-th/0611221].
[38] S. Winitzki, Lect. Notes Phys. 738, 157 (2008)
[arXiv:gr-qc/0612164].
[39] A. Aguirre, S. Gratton, and M. C. Johnson, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 98, 131301 (2007) [arXiv:hep-th/0612195].
[40] R. Bousso, R. Harnik, G. D. Kribs, and G. Perez, Phys.
Rev. D 76, 043513 (2007) [arXiv:hep-th/0702115].
[41] A. H. Guth, J. Phys. A 40, 6811-6826 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0702178].
[42] R. Bousso and I-S. Yang, Phys. Rev. D 75 123520 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0703206].
16
[43] M. Li and Y. Wang, JCAP 0706, 012 (2007)
[arXiv:0704.1026 [hep-th]].
[44] N. Arkani-Hamed, S. Dubovsky, A. Nicolis,
E. Trincherini, and G. Villadoro, JHEP 0705, 055
(2007) [arXiv:0704.1814 [hep-th]].
[45] A. Linde, Lect. Notes Phys. 738, 1-54 (2008)
[arXiv:0705.0164 [hep-th]].
[46] A. Linde, JCAP 0706, 017 (2007) [arXiv:0705.1160 [hep-
th]].
[47] M. Li and Y. Wang, JCAP 0708, 007 (2007)
[arXiv:0706.1691 [hep-th]].
[48] T. Clifton, S. Shenker, and N. Sivanandam, JHEP 0709
034 (2007) [arXiv:0706.3201 [hep-th]].
[49] S. W. Hawking, “Volume Weighting in the No Boundary
Proposal,” arXiv:0710.2029 [hep-th].
[50] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 77, 043526
(2008) [arXiv:0711.2559 [hep-th]].
[51] J. B. Hartle, S. W. Hawking, and T. Hertog, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 100, 201301 (2008) [arXiv:0711.4630 [hep-th]];
Phys. Rev. D 77, 123537 (2008) [arXiv:0803.1663 [hep-
th]].
[52] S. Winitzki, Phys. Rev. D 78, 043501 (2008)
[arXiv:0803.1300 [gr-qc]].
[53] A. De Simone, A. H. Guth, M. P. Salem, and A. Vilenkin,
Phys. Rev. D 78, 063520 (2008) [arXiv:0805.2173 [hep-
th]].
[54] S. Winitzki, Phys. Rev. D 78, 063517 (2008)
[arXiv:0805.3940 [gr-qc]].
[55] R. Bousso, B. Freivogel, and I-S. Yang, Phys. Rev. D 79,
063513 (2009) [arXiv:0808.3770 [hep-th]].
[56] A. De Simone, A. H. Guth, A. Linde, M. Noorbala,
M. P. Salem, and A. Vilenkin, “Boltzmann Brains and
the Scale-Factor Cutoff Measure of the Multiverse,”
arXiv:0808.3778 [hep-th].
[57] S. Winitzki, Phys. Rev. D 78, 123518 (2008)
[arXiv:0810.1517 [gr-qc]].
[58] A. Linde, V. Vanchurin, and S. Winitzki, JCAP 0901,
031 (2009) [arXiv:0812.0005 [hep-th]].
[59] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, JCAP 0901, 021 (2009)
[arXiv:0809.4257 [hep-th]].
[60] R. Bousso, “Complementarity in the Multiverse,”
arXiv:0901.4806 [hep-th].
[61] D. N. Page, “Sensible Quantum Mechanics: Are Only
Perceptions Probabilistic?” arXiv:quant-ph/9506010;
Int. J. Mod. Phys.D5, 583 (1996) [arXiv:gr-qc/9507024];
in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited
by Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2003), pp. 468-506 [arXiv:quant-ph/0108039].
[62] A. M. Gleason, Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics
6, 885-893 (1957).
[63] D. N. Page, “Observational Consequences of Many-
Worlds Quantum Theory,” arXiv:quant-ph/9904004; in
General Relativity and Relativistic Astrophysics, Eighth
Canadian Conference, Montreal, Quebec, 1999, edited
by C. P. Burgess and R. C. Myers (American Insti-
tute of Physics, Melville, New York, 1999), pp. 225-232
[arXiv:gr-qc/0001001].
[64] L. Dyson, M. Kleban, and L. Susskind, JHEP 0210, 011
(2002) [arXiv:hep-th/0208013].
[65] A. Albrecht, in Science and Ultimate Reality: Quantum
Theory, Cosmology, and Complexity, edited by J. D. Bar-
row, P. C. W. Davies, and C. L. Harper, Jr. (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), pp. 363-401
[arXiv:astro-ph/0210527].
[66] A. Albrecht and L. Sorbo, Phys. Rev. D 70, 063528
(2004) [arXiv:hep-th/0405270].
[67] D. N. Page, J. Korean Phys. Soc. 49, 711-714 (2006)
[arXiv:hep-th/0510003].
[68] A. V. Yurov and V. A. Yurov, “One More Observa-
tional Consequence of Many-Worlds Quantum Theory,”
arXiv:hep-th/0511238.
[69] D. N. Page, Phys. Rev. D 78, 063535 (2008)
[arXiv:hep-th/0610079].
[70] R. Bousso and B. Freivogel, JHEP 0706, 018 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0610132].
[71] D. N. Page, JCAP 0701, 004 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0610199].
[72] A. Linde, JCAP 0701, 022 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0611043].
[73] D. N. Page, Phys. Rev. 78, 063536 (2008)
[arXiv:hep-th/0611158].
[74] A. Vilenkin, JHEP 0701, 092 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0611271].
[75] D. N. Page, Phys. Lett. B 669, 197-200 (2008)
[arXiv:hep-th/0612137].
[76] V. Vanchurin, Phys. Rev. D 75, 023524 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0612215].
[77] T. Banks, “Entropy and Initial Conditions in Cosmol-
ogy,” arXiv:hep-th/0701146.
[78] S. Carlip, JCAP 0706, 001 (2007)
[arXiv:hep-th/0703115].
[79] S. B. Giddings and D. Marolf, Phys. Rev. D 76, 064023
(2007) [arXiv:0705.1178 [hep-th]].
[80] S. B. Giddings, Mod. Phys. Lett. A 22, 2949-2954 (2007)
[arXiv:0705.2197 [hep-th]].
[81] M. Li and Y. Wang, “Typicality, Freak Observers and
the Anthropic Principle of Existence,” arXiv:0708.4077
[hep-th].
[82] J. D. Barrow and D. J. Shaw, Class. Quant. Grav. 25,
085012 (2008) [arXiv:0712.2190 [gr-qc]].
[83] D. N. Page, “Observational Selection Effects in Quantum
Cosmology,” arXiv:0712.2240 [hep-th].
[84] R. Bousso, Gen. Rel. Grav. 40, 607-637 (2008)
[arXiv:0712.3324 [hep-th]].
[85] R. Bousso, B. Freivogel, and I-S. Yang, Phys. Rev. D 77,
103514 (2008) [arXiv:0712.3324 [hep-th]].
[86] N. Arkani-Hamed, S. Dubovsky, L. Senatore, and G. Vil-
ladoro, JHEP 0803, 075 (2008) [arXiv:0801.2399 [hep-
ph]].
[87] J. R. Gott, III, “Boltzmann Brains: I’d Rather See than
Be One,” arXiv:0802.0233 [gr-qc].
[88] B. Freivogel and M. Lippert, JHEP 0812, 096 (2008)
[arXiv:0807.1104 [hep-th]].
[89] L. Mersini-Houghton and F. C. Adams, Class. Quant.
Grav. 25, 165002 (2008) [arXiv:0810.4914 [gr-qc]].
[90] D. Overbye, “Big Brain Theory: Have Cosmologists Lost
Theirs?” New York Times, January 15, 2008.
